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Abstract 
With China’s rapid economic growth in recent years, many Chinese firms especially in high-tech industries have 
started to technically lead in the international market. In this study, we aim to uncover the root causes that lead to 
Chinese firms’ catching up from network perspective. By taking Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. as a case, we 
integrate absorptive capacity development and firm-level catching up into an alliances-based network framework. 
We found that network alliances with firms and universities complement each other at different catching up stages; 
and alliances-based network provides a springboard for Chinese firms to shorten catching up path. We argue that in 
Chinese context, impact of FDI on firms’ performance comes into effect only if partnership is carried out; alliances 
with universities facilitate development of absorptive capacity at an early stage; Partnering with leading players 
stimulate R&D investment at a late stage and simultaneously enhance firm’s innovation performance as well. 
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1. Introduction 
The central idea of national catching up is the technologic and economic convergence between leading countries and 
followers (Abramotiz, 1986). Since 1960s, with the empirical studies of catching up experience of the US, Japan, 
and South Korea, this theory has been rapidly developed. Freeman (2002) argued that technology and innovation are 
central to the catching-up process; latecomer firms have advantage to target progressive and dynamic industries. 
Perez and Soete (1988) claim that once latecomer firms have enough time and sufficient productive capability as 
well as other resource endowment (especially human capital relevant for new technologies), catching up can be 
achieved through ‘window of opportunity’.  
As one of emerging economies, China’s spectacular economic growth and unprecedented success have 
attracted much attention from both academic scholars and policy-makers alike. Undoubtedly, today’s China has 
been the single most important new development affecting the world economy at the outset of the 21st century 
(Elchengreen and Tong, 2007). China’s GDP has been the third largest country in the world after the US and Japan. 
China is now the world’s sixth largest trader, supplying more than six per cent of global exports, and the leading 
destination of foreign direct investment.  
With China’s rapid development, many Chinese firms have already been the leading players in the 
international market. LUBS research report said that Chinese multinationals could no longer be regarded as 
‘apprentices’ on the international stage; they have already been investing in the developed countries to obtain 
intellectual property and to learn from joint venture partners (LUBS report, Jan. 2009). 
In the academic field, much attention has focused at macro-economic level on the impact of FDI on China’s 
economic growth. In the early stage, inward FDI in China was extensively studied. Scholars made consensus that 
FDI significantly and positively impacted on China’s industrialization as well as productivity (i.e. Kueh, 1992; 
Wang and Swain, 1995, Liu et al., 2001; Heid and Ries, 1996). Later on, as Chinese firms emerged as a strong group 
of foreign direct investors in other developed and developing countries, much research effort was switched to 
Chinese outward FDI and its impact on firm’s development and other countries’ economic growth (i.e. Elchengreen 
and Tong, 2007).  
We found that fewer studies at micro-level have considered frameworks that lead to Chinese firms’ catching 
up. Maybe it is because the number of successful catching up firms from China is not large. Child and Rodrigues 
(2005) have ever initiated an article aiming to stimulate discussion on this issue. However, as we can see, the studies 
are still very limited. Yu et al. (2006) gave the evidence that there have been a number of Chinese companies 
catching up. Duysters et al. (2009) argued in a case study of Haier Group that there is an alternative strategy for 
many Chinese firms to the much-acclaimed East-Asian route to growth.  They all highlighted the importance of 
strategic alliances in the cases but unfortunately did not pay much attention to explore the catching up framework. 
Therefore in this study, we seek to identify a framework that part of Chinese firms in ICT industry used for 
catching up. By taking Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. as a case work, we try to find out the strategies that Chinese 
firms used for developing absorptive capacity and innovation performance.  
Based on the case study of Huawei, we argue that FDI is inter-dependent with strategic alliances in the early 
stages of catching up and network alliances with universities and other firms effectively facilitate Chinese firm’s 
development. We are not saying that this network perspective view on catching-up framework is suitable for all 
Chinese firms, but at least it provides other latecomer firms with a referred mechanism. We expect this study could 
stimulate more discussion on Chinese firms’ catching up, catching up strategies, and catching up frameworks.  
The study proceeds as follows. Firstly, a brief explanation of core concepts like strategic alliances and 
absorptive capacity is given in section 2. Afterwards, an overview of catching up in China’s context is presented, 
including China’s absorptive capacity at national level and Chinese firms’ mode choice in a catching up trajectory. 
Then, section 4 focuses on the case study of Huawei Technologies Co.Ltd. from alliances-based network 
perspective; and finally we give the discussion, conclusion, and future research in section 5.   
 
2. Core Concepts 
2.1 Strategic Alliances 
In line with previous alliance research (Yoshino and Rangan, 1995; Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997; De Man et al, 
2001; Heimeriks, 2004), we define strategic alliances as agreements between two or more partners as a cooperative 
form towards a common goal by sharing necessary resources as well as coordinating activities. 
Besides the advantages that collaboration encompasses such as flexibility, commitment reduction, and 
facilitating organizational learning etc. (Mowery et al.,1992; Chan, 1997) , strategic alliances have additionally 
advantages in offering opportunities to (a) access market; (b) accelerate the return on investment; (c) share the cost 
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of investment such as R&D; (d) spread risk; (e) access resources such as complementary technology; (f) create 
efficiencies through economies of scale and scope; (g) co-opt competition. ompanies using strategic alliances might 
gain an early window on emerging opportunities that they may want to commit to more fully in the future (Schilling 
and Steensma, 2001) and obtain overall level of flexibility by establishing a limited stake in a venture while 
maintaining the flexibility to either increase their commitment later or shift these resources to another opportunity 
(Schilling and Steensma, 2001) 
 
2.2 Absorptive Capacity 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990)  define absorptive capacity as a firm’s general ability to value, assimilate, and 
commercialize new, external knoweldge. They argue that a firm’s absorptive capacity is develped cumulatively, path 
dependent, and based on prior investments in its member’s absorptive capacity.  
In the school of absorptive capacity, many scholars explored internal determinants of absorptive capacity. 
Nicholls-Nixon (1993) examined the role of absorptive capacity in pharmaceutical firms’ responsees to the 
technological discontinuity created by the emergence of biotechnology. She measured absorptive capacity in three 
ways: the number of biotechnology patents the firm held, the number of new products it had on the market or under 
development, and its reputation for expertise in the human healthier appalications of biotechnology. She found that 
firms with high levels of absorptive capacity invested more in their own R&D, utilizeed alliances, in-house expertise 
with relevant technologies, and communications with alliance partners.  
Absorptive capacity of allainces partners are related to learning process. Lane and Lubakin (1998) argue that 
absorptive capacity is a function of the absorptive capacity of the dyad. Koza and Lewin (1998) address the 
importance of absorptive capacity by considering different type of alliances in terms of non-equity allainces (such as 
joint R&D, franchasing, and licensing) and equity alliances (such as joint venture). They propose that non-equity 
based exploration alliances are greater interdependent than equity based exploitation between absorptive capcity and 
learning of each partner. 
 
3. Catching up Analysis in Chinese context 
Based on a historical analysis, Mokyr (1990) argues that technology catching up is an outcome of a process of 
technology accumulation. Abramovitz (1989:222) argues that a country’s potential for rapid growth is strong not 
when it is backward without qualification, but rather when it is technologically backward but socially advanced. In 
other words, absorptive capacity can be established only if sufficient social capability has been built. In the dynamic 
economic evolution, the potential for developing absorptive capacity at a basic level is not only associated with a 
country’s endowment of high skilled labor but also closely related to the corresponding mechanism of open 
communication.  Therefore, we argue that an embedded catching up system is developed within an individual-
organization-society ‘pyramid’ in which absorptive capacity is built on social capability and catching up is generated 
when absorptive capacity and social capacity are prepared. 
 
3.1 China’s absorptive capacity at national level  
To measure China’s national-level absorptive capacity, two indicators can be chosen. First is the endowment of 
researchers and the other is the ratio of R&D investment over GDP. According to the announcement from OECD in 
2006, the number of researchers in China has increased over 77% from 1995 to 2005, China has ranked the second 
worldwide with 926 000 researchers by 2005, just behind the United States. Figure 1 gives the comparison across 
OESO, Netherlands, European Union Countries, and China on ratio of R&D investment over GDP. In order to 
identify the main characteristics of China’s national absorptive capacity, the source of R&D expenses and the 
allocated distribution of R&D fund are also considered. From figure1 we can see China’s investment in R&D over 
GDP was averagely above 1.05% per year; by 2006, this ratio had approached to 1.5%. According to the report 
submitted by National Development and Reform Commission to National People’s Congress, China is aiming to 
raise spending on research and development up to 1.58 percent of GDP in 2009. These two indicators implicate that 
China’s absorptive capacity at national level has been tremendously developed; measuring at a country level, the 
technology gap between China and European developed countries is getting smaller.  
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Figure 1 R&D expenditure based on GDP  
According to China Statistic yearbook of Science and Technology (2007), government has not been a major 
source of R&D fund. From figure 2 we can see in 2006, only 24.7% of R&D fund was from government; whereas 
69.1% was from enterprise and 4.6% from banks, which is comparable with that in 1999, in which the ratio is 
32.4%, 34.9%, and 8.8% respectively. A report from Economist on Dec. 20, 2008 said that China is now close to 
surpassing Japan in total research spending, from almost nothing a decade ago; and corporate R&D in China has 
soared 23% comparing with 1-2% between 2001 and 2006 in America and Europe. The changes in the source of 
R&D investment imply that Chinese enterprises have intentionally started to build up absorptive capacity.  
 
 
Figure 2 the funding source of R&D investment  
 
With respect to the distribution of R&D expenditure, the data from China Statistic Yearbook of Science and 
Technology (2007) reflects that 71% of R&D funds were allocated to enterprises and 18.9% to domestic research 
institutes and universities. Since public research institutes & universities in China are closely technological 
collaborating with enterprises, it is sensible that part of R&D investment by enterprises was spent in the university-
industry collaborative R&D projects.   
 
3.2 Chinese firms’ catching up strategies  
At national level, absorptive capacity can be developed through many channels, of which the most attractive and 
well researched is foreign direct investment (De Mello, 1997; Dunning, 1993). Studies on this topic have offered 
many empirical evidences, showing that FDI is an important vehicle for technology transfer and contributing to host 
countries’ economic growth (Borenszein et.al, 1998; Reichert and Weinhold, 2001).  
The important role of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) in host countries is that technologies can be 
transferred not only through linkage between MNEs and their subsidies in the host country2, but also through 
knowledge spillovers via inter-organization cooperation. Through labor turnover, competition force, demonstration 
effect, and forward as well as backward linkages, FDI could undoubtedly be used at the pre-catching up stage to 
establish a minimal level of absorptive capacity for host country firms.   
                                                 
2 mainly determined by the absorptive capacity of MNE’s subsidies in host country and the willingness of their parent company 
to take technology transfer.  
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Table 1 presents the conclusive characteristics and strategies applied at each stage of catching up by backward 
country firms. In addition to absorptive capacity, knowledge accumulation at each stage is also notified. It is clear 
that as catching up proceeds, strategies used for acquiring external technologies evolve as well.  
In China, since 1978 when open-door economic reform was initiated, FDI has been acknowledged as the main 
mode to accelerate Chinese economy growth. The underlying argument concerns that the MNEs’ entries have a 
forcement effect on Chinese local companies. On the one hand, local companies that could not shoulder competition 
pressure from foreign rivals were firstly displaced3. On the other hand, the survival indigenous companies which can 
survive were forced to improve absorptive capacity via inter-firm cooperation (such as forward and backward 
linkage in FDI). Many local multinational enterprises such as Changhong, Huawei, Haier, Lenovo, and Galanz et al. 
surviving at that time had significantly benefited from cooperating with foreign enterprises. Therefore, we argue that 
the effect of FDI is inter-dependent on the corresponding inter-firm collaborations.  
As indicated in table 1, catching up country has a variety of choices to enhance absorptive capacity. At 
different stages, absorptive capacity could be developed through an integrative mechanism where national actors 
complement each other. In other words by taking China as an example, numerous strategies are implemented at the 
same time by national actors. Firms that have already been relatively technological advanced are preferable to 
implementing less committed governance modes such as R&D agreement and strategic alliances. Firms that sit 
behind are on the contrary feel security to rely on stronger ties forming a valid and high committed governance 
mode, i.e. merger and acquisitions, or joint ventures. At a firm level, each Chinese enterprise has its own learning 
network with a number of learning partners and learning modes. Firms that can manage its network well and 
actively play as a network hub or cover network structure hole are able to preemptively grasp technical knowledge 
and market.  
 
Table 1 Strategies used in different stages of catching up  
Economic 
Growth Stage 
Absorptive 
Capacity 
Economies’ 
characteristic 
Strategies to accumulate 
knowledge 
Level of 
knowledge 
accumulation 
Pre-catching 
up 
Very low 
but might 
be 
increasing 
Resource-based; 
Unskilled labor; 
Low level of inward 
technology transfer 
Low level of Inward FDI and no 
outward FDI 
Low but might 
be increasing 
Catching up Increasing 
to 
reach peak 
Knowledge 
infrastructure and 
domestic industrial 
capacity; high rate of 
knowledge 
accumulation and 
absorption of external 
knowledge 
Assimilation of spillovers from 
trade or inward FDI; 
Technology licensing; reverse 
engineering (early stage) and 
R&D (late stage);acquisition of 
technology by M&A 
Rapidly 
increasing 
Pre-frontier declining Assimilation becomes 
difficult; marginal 
return of absorptive 
capacity declining. 
Strategic alliances; in-house R&D; 
outward FDI; joint venture 
Increasing rate 
decline and 
reaching the flat 
range 
 
Network leader in Chinese catching up networks are identified having a number of common traits. For 
instance, they either posit the important interfaces across different sub-network as a broker or connect with almost 
all the other actors as a center. The involved actors in network include profit-oriented firms, universities & institutes, 
and western companies doing business in China. Based on the observation on Chinese context, we therefore have  
Proposition 1: firms that embrace higher volume of network resource have higher probability to access a 
variety of knowledge and markets. 
Proposition 2: firms that locate in network center have higher probability to catch up successfully.  
We give the proof of these two propositions in section 4 by studying a case of Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.  
                                                 
3
 This happened in the late 1980s till mid of 1990. Some state-owned-enterprise that did not endow capability to shoulder the 
competitive stress went into bankrupt. 
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4. Case study of Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. 
In principle, success in catching up is labeled by the increased marketing performance and raised innovative 
capability. In this section, an integrative strategy package will be illustrated to see why some Chinese firms could be 
successful in the international market and how could they ladder quickly to the upper stages. We will take the 
experience of Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. as an example and specifically analyze the strategies for developing 
absorptive capacity and innovation performance.   
Huawei is a Chinese company in ICT industry. It is the largest and most prestigious networking and 
telecommunications equipment supplier in China. Huawei has now had eight overseas regional departments and 85 
branch offices around the world. Its industrial status in ICT industry is equal to many multinational companies from 
western countries.  
Huawei’s business includes manufacturing and supplying CDMA, 3G terminals, intelligent optical network 
ASON, core routers, and switching in the world. To help readers have more familiarity with Huawei, we list part of 
Huawei’s recent marketing performance as below4. 
• Huawei’s WCDMA products have won business application in 26 countries and regions, including 
Netherlands, United Arab Emirates, HKSAR, Mauritius, and Malaysia (Ditterner, 2005).  
• Huawei’s 75% of sales were from overseas market and by 2005 Huawei ranks No.2 in the global market 
in respect of optical network and DWDM products (Ovum-RHK, 2005).  
• Sales amount of Huawei’s softswitch products rank No. 1 in the world (Ditterner, 2005).  
• Intelligent NetworkHuawei has the most subscribers around the world in this field (Ovum-RHK, 2005) 
• Huawei’s IP DSLAM products rank No.1 in the global market (Infonetics, 2005 Q2). 
• Sales amount of Huawei’s MSAN products also ranks No. 1 in the global market (Source: Infonetics, 
1H05) 
• Huawei’s routers rank No.3 in the global router market (Gartner, 2005 Q2) 
• Huawei is the global WCDMA network priority suppliers of Vodafone 
• Huawei is the global cooperative partner in WCDMA and broadband equipment  
• Huawei undertakes the largest NGN network of Germany 
 
To estimate Huawei’s innovation performance, we collected patent data from SIPO, USPTO, and EPO, as the 
performance in USPTO and EPO can represent Huawei’s innovative power in developed regions; and patents in 
SIPO either in English or Chinese can reflect Huawei’s competitive capability of innovation performance within 
China’s domestic market. The data from other countries patent databases was not collected, even though Huawei has 
been recognized and awarded by World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 2009 as the World’s Top 
International Patent Seeker (which ended the almost one decades of domination by Netherlands’ Philips Electronics 
as the first place on the list).  
 
Figure 3 Huawei’s patents in USPTO, EPO, and SIPO 
Source: USPTO, EPO, and SIPO; collected by author 
 
Based on the data collected, we drew the picture in figure 3. Since the number of patents is usually considered 
as an important indicator of firm’s innovation performance, we can see that Huawei’s innovative capability primarily 
emerged in 1998 and its marginal increase rate was really high from 2000. In China’s domestic market, English 
                                                 
4All these information has been collected in <<Shenzhen Company Profiles>> 
www.torinowireless.it/download.php?fileID=187&lang=it 
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versioned SIPO patents are specially used to defend from foreign competitors. Figure 3 shows that Huawei worked 
also hard in China’s competitive ‘domestic international market’.  Despite the number of patents applied in USPTO 
is too small to be recognized in figure 3, if just considering the proportion of patents applied in USPTO by Huawei 
over the whole number of Chinese patents in USPTO each year, we can have conclusion that almost 16% of Chinese 
patents applied in USPTO each year were accounted by Huawei. Moreover, more patents assigning to Huawei in 
Europe than that in USPTO implies that Huawei has larger market share in Europe than in U.S. From both 
marketing and innovation performance perspectives, Huawei’s catching up performed successfully.  
In order to have thoroughly logical analysis, let us go through with Huawei’s history. Huawei was established 
by Ren Zhengfei in 1988 in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, China. Initially it was just a small distributor of 
imported PBX products without any telecommunication knowledge. Five years later, in 1993, Huawei had achieved 
its primary threshold of knowledge accumulation on PBX and successfully made the first breakthrough in C&C08 
digital telephone switch by effectively taking advantage of the technology diffusions from Shanghai Bell (the first 
Sino-foreign joint venture in China). Huawei thereafter successfully monopolized Chinese rural market and small 
cities. Afterwards, with higher product quality and improved product development, Huawei started to compete with 
foreign enterprises in Chinese urban market.  
As its expertise in networking products, Huawei is also a network operator in the industry. Its network strategy 
made it benefit not only in normal time but also in the economic crisis. Since the beginning of 2008 when global 
economic crisis started, Huawei’s sales has never stopped increasing, even more than 46% up from 2007, reaching 
USD23.3billion in 2008. After 20 years’ continuous development, today’s Huawei has been recognized by Business 
Week as the 3rd World’s Most Influential Company (following after Apply and Google).  
But how did Huawei achieve this performance? Simply speaking, Huawei’s success was owed to the close 
partnership with different players in the different sectors and regions. The primary decision made by Ren Zhengfei 
in 1990s to work with Shanghai Bell (which was actually the technology centre in communication sector in 1990s in 
China) and the Centre for Information Technology (CIT) brought Huawei much more technological knowledge and 
helped it finish a technological stage-skipping in telecommunication sector. We stress that the effect of FDI comes 
into effect on Chinese indigenous firms’ performance only if strategic alliances involved by Chinese firms can be 
established beforehand.  
In order to avoid direct competition with Shanghai Bell in 1990s, Huawei explored rural market with political 
support from Chinese government. Getting trust from government means that Huawei was not only able to receive 
much more privilege in China’s domestic market, but also having more financial credits for R&D fund. In 1994, 
Huawei became the first Chinese firm that established long distance transmission equipment business, launching 
HONET integrated access network and SDH product line.  
By 1996, Huawei had monopolized China’s rural regions and part of urban areas. Since then, Huawei started to 
extend market to overseas by using the similar marketing strategy called “from developing to developed regions”. 
Huawei firstly accessed to backward market that foreign multinationals did not intensively invest (for instance, 
South Africa, south-east Asia, and South America) and gradually penetrated to developed countries. By keeping 
collaboration with Chinese universities, Huawei step by step competed with foreign multinational companies also in 
overseas market. In 1997, Huawei successfully released its GSM products and eventually expanded to offer CDMA 
and UMTS, which was at that time considered impossible for developing country’ firms.  
In order to develop management skills and structure, Huawei invested in collaboration with IBM Consultant. 
Since 1998, this collaboration optimized Huawei’s management, organization, and product development structure. 
Quite fast, Huawei became a leading player in the telecommunication industry by providing diversified products 
ranging from switching, integrated access network, NGN, xDSL, optical transpot, intelligent network, GSM, GPRS, 
EDGE, W_CDMA, CDMA2000 as well as a full series of routers, and other LAN equipment.  
Besides catching up in management, Huawei invested heavily in Research and Development. Averagely each 
year, at least 10 % of annual sales were put into R&D for developing absorptive capacity. Huawei so far has 
established 14 R&D centers around the world, being embedded in the collaboration with suppliers, customers, 
universities, and leading players. Huawei’s alliance-based network is characterized by multidiscipline, multi-level, 
and multiregions. Table 2 lists Huawei’s partnership history with leading players, from which we identify that firstly, 
Huawei’s alliances activities started very early even when it was just founded; Secondly, alliances happened 
frequently with alliance partners who were not restricted within the same sector; Finally, alliances network enlarged 
and embedded quickly, by which Huawei gained a list of partners to work with in a stable way.  
As what Huawei people declared, they aim to be abreast with the latest technology and quickly incorporate 
advanced technology into its own knowledge base. Huawei people believe that the cooperation with leading 
multinational companies can help them enlarge technology base and achieve win-win outcome. Therefore, since 
1997, Huawei have established joint ventures (1) with Siemens on the research, production, sales, and services of 
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TD-SCDMA in order to further advance its technology development; (2) with Motorola in Shanghai to engage in 
providing global customers with powerful UMTS products, solutions, and HSPA; (3)with many prestigious 
companies such as Intel, Texas Instruments, Freescales Semiconductor, Qualcomm, Infineon, Agere Systems, 
Microsoft, IBM, Sun Microsystems HP, ADI, Altera, Motorola, Oracle, SUN, TI, and Xilinx for a number of joint 
laboratories; (4) with many other world leading management consultant companies such as Hay Group, PwC, and 
FhG to introduce a series of advanced processes such as IPD (Integrated Product Development), ISC (Integrated 
Supply Chain), IT-based management system in human resource management, financial management, and quality 
control.  
Figure 4 shows that technological alliances with foreign firms are classified into three groups: with Japanese, 
American, and European enterprises. Of there, thirty-six per cent inter-firm alliances were conducted with American 
firms; forty-three were focused with European enterprises; and twenty-one per cent alliances were happened with 
Japanese companies. The regional distribution of Huawei-foreign alliances indicates that Huawei’s strategic 
alliances are intended to be with advanced countries firms that embrace relatively high industry reputation, lager 
technology base, and embedded collaboration networks. If we consider further to check the network position of 
Huawei’s alliances partners in the corresponding region/sector, we can find that all of them are absolutely holding 
the cluster center. This means that Huawei’s strategy to work with them is beneficial for it as a network broker 
accessing a larger network resource from other clusters.  
 
 
 
Figure 4 Regional Distribution of Huawei-foreign Alliances 
 
Besides dyadic alliances, Huawei is actively working on numerous promising technology networks. In May 
2006, Huawei was invited to join the SCOPE Alliance Network and committed to support SCOPE’s mission of 
enabling and promoting the availability and interoperability of open carrier grid base platforms.  In Dec. 2008, 
Huawei entered into the Open Handset Alliance Network and planned to launch smart phones based on the Android 
platform in 2009.  In Feb. 2009, Huawei was invited to participate Open Patent Alliance (OPA), which is a group 
formed in June 2008 by members of the WiMAX ecosystem such as Alcatel-Luucent, Cisco, Clearwire, Intel, and 
Samsung Electronics, aiming to form a WiMAX patent pool and aggregate patent rights to implement the WiMAX 
standard. Huawei’s participation was derived from its significant contribution to development of OFDM & MIMO 
broadband wireless technologies. As the vice president of Wireless product line and president of CDMA & WiMAX 
product line of Huawei said, Huawei’s joining OPA will ultimately promote Huawei to offer broader choice and 
lower TCO for WiMAX technology and also will help them deliver more products with high quality around the 
world at affordable prices5.  
 
Table2  The Memo of Huawei’s Alliances (1989-present) 
Announced 
Date 
(mm/dd//yy) 
Name of Partners Partner 
Nation 
Joint Venture 
Flag 
 
1989-1994 Shanghai Bell Telephone 
Manufacturing Company (BTM) 
Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
Sino-U.S. 
JV 
China 
No 
02/20/97 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
Texas Instruments 
China 
USA 
No 
                                                 
5
 Refer to Huawei’s global website http://www.huawei.com 
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04/09/97 
 
BETO 
TELEKOM 
Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
Russian Fed 
Russian Fed 
China 
Yes 
 
08/26/99 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
Fujian Provincial Mobile 
China 
China 
No 
06/08/00 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
QUALCOMM Inc 
China 
USA 
No 
11/27/01 NEC Corp 
Matsushita Commun Industrial 
Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
Japan 
Japan 
China 
Yes 
10/21/02 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
Agere System 
China 
USA 
No 
10/21/02 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
Microsoft 
China 
USA 
Joint lab 
10/23/02 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
NEC Corp 
China 
Japan 
Yes 
03/19/03 3Com Corp 
Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
USA 
China 
Yes 
06/04/03 Avici Systems Inc 
Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
USA 
China 
No 
08/29/03 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
Siemens Info & Commun Mobile 
China 
Germany 
Yes 
09/16/03 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
Infineon Technologies AG 
China 
Germany 
No 
02/12/04 Information & Communication Mo 
Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
Germany 
China 
Yes 
04/25/05 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
Intel 
China 
USA 
No 
03/02/06 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
HP 
China 
USA 
No 
05/31/06 Huawei 
Freescale Semiconductor 
China 
USA 
No 
07/25/06 Motorola Inc 
Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
USA 
China 
Yes 
02/13/07 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
Qualcomm Inc. 
China 
USA 
No 
05/14/07 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
Global Marine Systems Ltd 
China 
United 
Kingdom 
Yes 
05/21/07 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
Symantec Corp 
China 
USA 
Yes 
10/31/07 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
International Telecommunication 
Union 
China 
Internationa
l Institute 
No 
1998-2003 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
IBM 
China 
USA 
Consultant 
Agreement 
12/12/08 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
Microsoft 
China 
USA 
No 
03/20/09 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
Infineon 
China 
Germany 
No 
08/09/09 
01/01/01 
Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
Sun Microsystems Inc. 
China 
USA 
Telecom 
Lab 
1997-Now Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
Hay Group 
China 
USA 
Consultant 
agreement 
1997-Now Huawei Technologies Co Ltd China Consultant 
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PwC Britain Agreement 
1997-Now Huawei Technologies Co Ltd 
FhG 
China 
USA 
Consultant 
Agreement 
Source: SDC database and various media announcement. 
Note: the alliances partners appeared above are mostly Huawei’s long-term collaborators. Despite 
some of them have been competitors, the dyadic alliances are still continuing and partnership is 
natured of stability and repeatability. 
 
In line with allying with leading players, Huawei never stopped research alliances with universities. So far, 
Huawei has been building advanced research labs with more than 20 Chinese domestic research institutes and 
universities such as Beijing University (since Nov. 2005), Zhongshan University, China (since Dec. 2008), Zhejiang 
University, China (since March, 2008), Tsinghua University, China (since Jan. 2007), University of Science and 
Technology of China (since April, 2009), Xi Dian University, China (since Dec. 2007), Sanjiang Unversity, China 
(since Sept, 2007), Northwest Polytechnical University, China (since Oct. 2004) etc.  
Moreover, more than 10 joint training programs with Chinese universities in different regions were founded, 
namely ‘Huawei High Level Talented-Person Cultivation Base’ (Huawei Rencai Pei Yang Ji Di). These joint 
programs are purposive to provide Chinese graduates with pre-career education. Huawei treated universities and 
institutes as its knowledge incubator because it has been proved to offer Huawei much more benefits than expected. 
In recent years, Huawei extended investment on technological alliances to a number of foreign universities such as 
INATEL University, Brazil (since Sept. 2003) and Shrif University, Iran (since July, 2009).  
In order to find a short-cut solution for standardization of technical training in China’s ICT sector, Huawei 
established Huawei University in 2005. This university has seven University Subsidiaries located across China (in 
Beijing, Xi’an, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Chongqing, Kunming, and Kuilin). It is aimed to enhance the intra-sector 
communication and offer the best training for ICT players in China. Technological engineers and managers from 
each ICT firm are welcomed. In order to catch up the international training standard, Huawei University invested 
dramatically on hiring professional researchers domestically and abroad. Unlike alliances with other firms, Huawei 
University not only offered a springboard for China’s ICT sector to develop absorptive capacity interactively, but 
also enhanced Huawei’s reputation.  The exchanged information/technology intra China’s ICT sector was thereafter 
blooming out; and Huawei certainly becomes the ‘Knowledge Hub’ of ICT network in China.   
Comparing with technological alliances, Merger and Acquisitions (M&As) were not implemented quite often 
by Huawei. Table 3 lists M&As activities involving Huawei from 1989. From that we can see Huawei’s activities in 
acquisition started just from recent years and they were mainly located in China’s domestic market or backward 
countries. This implies that M&As was not a priority of governance mode for Huawei in absorbing 
technology/knowledge. In contrast, it was a short-cut way to dominant low-income market.  
Therefore, strategic alliances are the priority strategy that Huawei used to absorb external knowledge. The 
universities-involved network facilitated Huawei to grab human capital preemptively6 and efficiently digest frontier 
technology as well. Because a number of top Chinese universities have cooperation with foreign universities, 
Huawei benefits a lot in term of knowledge diffusion. Huawei could hear the latest research result raised in academy 
field and from this point universities are also acting Huawei’s listening ear. 
Also, Huawei’s partnership history indicates that Chinese firms can shorten catching up process by using 
alliances-based network. Unlike the widely acceptable catching-up model in which latecomers go through OEM, 
ODM, and OBM (i.e. Lee and Lim, 2001), Huawei’s technological catching-up is characteristic of stage-skipping7. 
By going through replicable imitation stage, innovative imitation stage, and self-innovation step within 20 years, 
Huawei maintains its own brand. To build up the basic knowledge base, Huawei insists on close collaboration with 
local universities and research institutes. It can be identified that Huawei’s initial success is attributed to a large 
alliance-based network; and only if the R&D collaboration with universities is executed, alliances with leading 
players could become ‘a cherry on the cake’.    
Moreover, Huawei’s strategy in choosing network positions could not be ignored, because the network position 
determines the orientation of knowledge flow.  Huawei’s concentrative working on alliance-based network with 
universities and leading players has offered itself continuously upgraded network position as well as high reputation. 
                                                 
6
 Unlike other foreign MNEs strategies in attracting excellent graduates6, Huawei, from the beginning, keeps working with 
universities to nurture the pre-graduates; it even set up the Huawei training centers in many universities. The excellent graduates 
are attracted there, not only because the average salary per year offered to graduates is relatively higher than that by foreign 
MNEs, but also because the rich program of training are provided each year. 
7
 Huawei did not picked up the analogue electronic switch technology as a basic level, but rather smartly jumping to the most 
popular technologies taken by foreign companies at that time---the digital electronic switch technology 
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Today, Huawei has not been that small firm without any market influence as 20 year ago; in contrast, it has been no 
questionably considered as a central actor in China’s ICT sector network.  
The miracle changes of Huawei’s position implicate that Huawei’s strategy for developing network power is 
really effective. In the international market, Huawei plays as a strong competitor with multinational companies such 
as Cisco System and Alcatel-Lucent etc. also as a humble learner from them. Encompassing a double-face identity 
(contributor as well as learner) gave benefits to Huawei that many competitors are more likely to invite it attending 
technology-based networks for research and patent sharing.  
Figure 5 presents Huawei’s strategy in alliance-based network. Except Huawei that located in the centre of 
figure 5, five groups of actors play in this network, which include western multinational companies (WMNC), 
western countries’ universities (WU), Chinese universities (CU), Chinese domestic companies (CC), and companies 
with low performance but high technology base either in China or overseas (LC). From the case study above, we can 
see Huawei attracted knowledge/technology inflow through a large number of stable direct connections with western 
multinational companies and Chinese universities. Moreover, in case of collaboration that happened between other 
Chinese firms and Chinese universities, Huawei absorbed knowledge diffusion indirectly through knowledge 
spillovers. This was similar in the cases between western multinational companies and western universities. Through 
direct collaborations with Chinese universities and western firms, the technology produced by western universities 
could be reached indirectly. On the one hand, Huawei extends knowledge acquisition via Chinese universities; on 
the other hand, Huawei keeps effort on speeding up indirect knowledge diffusion. The data from Huawei’s global 
website indicates that so far more than 30 R&D subsidiaries have been set up in Western Europe and North America 
and more than 75% of researchers are hired from local places.  
Moreover, knowledge inflow could also be derived from acquisitions in developed and developing nations, or 
domestic market. Even though there were not too many acquisition cases related to Huawei, Huawei’s motivation on 
acquisitions is very clear. We say that to promote its network position and enhance absorptive capabilities, Huawei’s 
action in acquiring target firms that contained high volume of technology but performed inefficiently due to dead 
management or blocked financial supply can be motivated. 
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Source: SDC database and collected by author 
 
 
 
Table 3 Huawei M&As (1989-2008) 
Announc
ed Date  
(mm/dd/
yy) 
Target Name Target  
Industry 
Sector 
Target 
Nation 
Acquirer 
Name 
Acquirer  
Industry 
Sector 
Acquirer 
Nation 
10/28/05 Huawei-
3com Co Ltd 
Prepackaged 
Software 
China 3Com Corp Computer 
and Office 
Equipment 
United 
States 
11/03/05 Huawei 
Technologie
s-South 
Business 
Services 
South 
Africa 
Nulane 
Investments 
Business 
Services 
South 
Africa 
11/07/05 Huawei 
Electronics 
Co Ltd 
Chemicals and 
Allied 
Products 
China Henkel AG & 
Co KGaA 
Soaps, 
Cosmetics, 
and 
Personal-
Care 
Products 
Germany 
11/15/06 Huawei-
3com Co Ltd 
Prepackaged 
Software 
China 3Com Corp Computer 
and Office 
Equipment 
United 
States 
              
03/19/03 3Com Corp-
Assets 
Prepackaged 
Software 
China Huawei 
Tech-Entrp 
Bus Asts 
Communic
ations 
Equipment 
China 
02/08/04 SUNDAY 
Communicat
ions Ltd 
Telecommunic
ations 
Hong 
Kong 
Huawei 
Technologies 
Co Ltd 
Communic
ations 
Equipment 
China 
08/08/05 Marconi 
Corp PLC 
Communicatio
ns Equipment 
United 
Kingdom 
Huawei 
Technologies 
Co Ltd 
Communic
ations 
Equipment 
China 
06/07/06 Harbour 
Networks 
Hldg-Assets 
Prepackaged 
Software 
China Huawei 
Technologies 
Co Ltd 
Communic
ations 
Equipment 
China 
06/23/06 Intercellular 
Nigeria Ltd 
Telecommunic
ations 
Nigeria Huawei 
Technologies 
Co Ltd 
Communic
ations 
Equipment 
China 
10/26/07 Shanxi 
Huashang 
Media Grp 
Co 
Advertising 
Services 
China Huawen 
Media 
Investment 
Corp 
Wholesale 
Trade-
Nondurable 
Goods 
China 
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Figure 5 Huawei’s strategy in alliance-based network 
 
5.  Conclusion 
Due to the research gap in previous studies on Chinese firms’ catching up from alliance-based network perspective, 
this study is aimed to find out the root causes of Chinese firms’ rapid development. The presentation of a case study 
on Huawei Technologies Co.Ltd. indicates that alliances-based network is an efficient mode for Chinese firms to 
shorten catching up path. Departing from previous studies that interpret Chinese firms’ development through FDI 
and government policy, this study not only highlights FDI’s positive impact on Chinese firm’s development, but also 
more importantly clarifies the significant role of collaboration network in foreign investment. 
By analyzing the case of Huawei Technologies Co.Ltd., two propositions were proved thoroughly. We say that 
at least in China’s context, firms that embrace higher volume of network resource have higher probability to access a 
variety of knowledge and markets; and firms that locate in network center are more likely to accomplish catching up 
successfully and quickly.  
We argued that for firms aiming to establish a primary base for absorptive capacity, alliances-based network 
could help to recognize knowledge diffusion at the first moment. We clarified the role of firm’s alliances-based 
network in the whole catching up path and involving actors, and stressed that the triangle shaped alliances cycle with 
universities and leading players can not only guarantee the network stability but also provide a suitable platform for 
absorptive capacity development. On the one hand, Chinese firms could establish a primary level of absorptive 
capacity with technologically working with universities; and on the other hand through alliances with leading 
players, Chinese firms could be motivated in R&D investment.  
Unlike previous studies, we claimed that FDI’s impact works through alliances-based network in China. Even 
though FDI is an effective mode for technology transfer which has been widely received consensus, we claim that it 
is true only when a firm stays at a pre-catching-up stage where knowledge absorption is passive; once if a firm is 
Notes:  
WU-Western University 
WMNC-Western Multinationals 
CU-Chinese Universities 
EMNC-Emerging Multinationals from China 
CC-Chinese domestic companies 
LC- companies with lower performance but higher technology base 
 
M&A            Technology Alliances       knowledge acquiring/flow path 
 
 
High-Tech 
W-MNC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mid-High 
Tech 
EMNC 
 
 
 
Low-Tech 
Low-perform. 
Local & other CC 
CU 
WU 
Huawei 
(HUB) 
WMNC 
LC 
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willing to actively absorb knowledge, wherever it stays in the catching up path, alliance-based network is the most 
effective mode. This is much departing from previous network studies, as combining alliances with universities and 
firms was not ever highlighted for backward firms. We argue that for backward country firms, universities and 
counterpart firms are quite necessary to be incorporated into alliances packages, because alliances with universities 
could significantly enhance a firm’s absorptive capacity in early stage; and allying with universities as well as firms 
could facilitate firm’s capability to absorb in the late stage.  
Alliances with partners from different regions are also important. As we claimed before that only if working 
with universities is executed, working with leading players could possibly become ‘a cherry on the cake’. For each 
Chinese firm, this does work effectively because working with advanced partners could be feasible only if firms 
have required knowledge base for certain technologies. And of course allying with advanced firms could possibly 
keep the company being abreast with the latest innovation and technology development, being alert to the 
competition, and investing in R&D as well as sharing the innovation challenge & risks.  
As the contributions of this study, we highlight that this study opened up a new stream of research on emerging 
economies firms’ catching up from network perspective. Strategic alliances will not only be an advanced governance 
mode for developed country firms to speed up new product development, but also an important strategic manner for 
emerging country firms to rapidly catch up. The case of Huawei proves that strategic alliance-based network is able 
to enhance firm’s absorptive capacity from the very beginning. This case from Chinese firm shows that the pre-
alliances with universities would be win-win awarded, as firms’ absorptive capacity could be built through 
technological alliances and universities could receive research fund as a return. We believe that network-stimulated 
development for backward country firms will be demonstrated as an efficient mode in other national context.  
Of course, this study contains several limitations. First, due to the strict permission to access Huawei’s intra 
database, we could not have more detailed information. All the data in this study were collected either from academy 
databases or media announcement. It is clear that there are still lots of alliances not being incorporated in the 
academy database. Therefore, we suggest that future studies could pay more attention on first-hand data collections, 
preferably interviews.  Second, this study was conducted upon a single company that has been very successful in 
China. However, it would be more completed if having more cases on this issue. We suggest that future studies can 
make comparison on a couple of cases, one firm caught up successfully due to high volume of strategic alliances; 
the other failed because of weak capability on strategic alliances (maybe due to a small number of alliances, or 
maybe due to weak alliance capability), so that a more objective judgment upon the impact of alliance-based 
network on emerging country firms’ catching up could be comprehensively presented.   
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